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Abstract
Mergers and spin−offs are typically opposite strategies for firms, and are not simultaneously
profitable in a standard linear Cournot model. We propose a simple spatial Cournot
framework, where merger is profitable but subsequent divisionalization is even more.
However, this is true only for partial spin−off, not for total divisionalization, due to the
opportunity for specific efficiency gains in a spatial setting. Finally, the resulting market
structure is analyzed in terms of a post−merger divestiture required by the merger control
authority. We show here the divestiture can be profitable for firms even if the merger was
not, while still fulfilling its corrective role.
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Merger and divisionalization are by deﬁnition opposite strategies for ﬁrms.
Moreover, they are mutually exclusive for Cournot ﬁrms from the proﬁtability
viewpoint, at least as long as the linearity assumptions on demand and cost
functions are maintained. Early contributions on merger theory pointed out the
(un)proﬁtability paradox for Cournot mergers (see Salant et al (1983)), whereas
the literature on divisionalization in a Cournot industry established that ﬁrms
have unilateral incentives to form independent competing units (see Corchon
(1991), Polasky (1992), Baye et al. (1996) and Corchon and Gonzalez-Maestre
(2000)). With constant identical marginal costs and product homogeneity, Cournot
merging partners acting jointly necessarily contract output and thus provide a pos-
itive externality for outsiders, hence the proﬁtability paradox. In contrast, divi-
sionalization represents a credible commitment to increase output, which allowed
Polasky (1992) and Baye et al (1996) to conclude, under the same hypotheses as
Salant et al. (1983), on the proﬁtability of divisionalization for a set of ﬁrms that
would ﬁnd merger unproﬁtable.
This paper tackles the opposition between the two, by studying in a simple
spatial Cournot model the optimality of complete integration of aﬃliates through
merger, despite its proven proﬁtability1.W e ﬁnd that the highest post-merger
proﬁt is actually obtained by only partially integrating aﬃliates.
In a non-spatial model with heterogenous constant marginal costs, Tombak
(2002) discusses precisely this decision to consolidate or not following a take-
over. Merger proﬁtability is restored if aﬃliates are run separately as independent
divisions. This is made possible in his framework by cost diﬀerentials, which
enable proﬁtable technology transfers between aﬃliates. He also studies the link
between integration and opportunity to monopolize a market2, and concludes that
consolidation of aﬃliates is optimal only for a monopoly, or, in the limit case, for
a ﬁrm prevented from further acquisitions by the anti-trust agency.
Our very simple framework conforms with this conclusion, in as much as the
merged entity fares better by running independent divisions. However, we con-
tradict the optimality of total divisionalization (i.e. single-store divisions) in a
framework with multi-store aﬃliates. This allows us to discuss the impact of
divestitures for merger proﬁtability, since spin-oﬀs are basically asset transfers
1By creating delivery cost diﬀerentials, the spatial framework allows merging ﬁrms to prof-
itably coordinate output decisions, provided they relocate (see McAﬀe et al. (1992) and Norman
and Pepall (1998, 2000)).
2See also Kamien and Zang (1990,1993)
1between ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that divesting is proﬁtable even when merging is not,
although it stills fulﬁlls its corrective role to lower the price. This may be a ratio-
nale for unproﬁtable mergers, which may be submitted so as to entail proﬁtable
divestitures afterwards.
2. Model
Consider the following very simple framework. An inﬁnite number of con-
sumers are uniformly located on the unit segment. Three Cournot ﬁrms pro-
duce a homogeneous good with the same technology exhibiting constant marginal
costs, normalized to zero. Two ﬁrms are single-store, whereas the third one oper-
ates three outlets. For ease of exposition, let stores 1, 2 and 3 be jointly owned,
whereas plants 4 and 5 be individually run. Plant’s i location is denoted by xi,
i =1 ,2,3,4,5. At any consumer location x on the segment, x ∈ [0;1],d e m a n di s
given by p(x)=a−Q(x), a>0,w h e r ep(x) i st h ep r o d u c tp r i c ea tt h a tl o c a t i o n
and Q(x) is the total output supplied at x. Firms incur transport costs (t|x − xi|),
linear in distance and quantity, in order to ship output to consumers. t is a positive
constant, but since the transport cost parameter enters as a multiple in the proﬁts
expression, for our proﬁtability analysis assume t =1without loss of generality3.
Consumers have a prohibitive costly transport cost, preventing arbitrage, so ﬁrms
can and will price discriminate across the set of spatially diﬀerentiated markets.
Given constant marginal delivery costs, a set of independent Cournot equilibria
obtains for each location x. There are no set-up or (re)location costs, nor merging
or spinning-oﬀ costs. Let a>1.5,s ot h a te a c hﬁrm supplies a positive quantity
at every local market.
Two mergers to duopoly are possible in this framework. We restrict our analy-
sis to the merger between the three-store ﬁrm and one of its single-store competi-
tors, since this will yield a suﬃcient number of outlets for the resulting entity to
allow the discussion of meaningful divestitures4.
The discussion is organized as follows: ﬁr s tw ei d e n t i f yt h ep o s t - m e r g e re q u i -
librium with centralized decision-making, and check corresponding merger prof-
itability5. We consider a simple two-period post-merger game: ﬁrms relocate
3Equivalently, let a be the transport-cost adjusted reservation price.
4When two single-store ﬁrms merge, discussing divestitures cannot be relevant, since divesting
one of the two plants implies that the merger should not have occured in the ﬁrst place.
5Norman and Pepall (2000) made clear that Cournot spatial mergers involving centralized
decisions can only be proﬁtable if stores relocate.
2simultaneously and then simultaneously play Cournot. The equilibrium concept
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show that partial spin-oﬀ in-
creases the merged entity’s proﬁt, and interpret this in terms of divestiture-based
outcome.
Merger
To discuss merger proﬁtability, we identify ﬁrst the location equilibria before
and after merger.
Pre-merger pattern
The analysis of Pal and Sarkar (2002) shows that both single-store ﬁrms locate
at the market center, together with one of the 3-store ﬁrm’s outlets, whereas its
remaining two stores are symmetrically located around 1/2.D e n o t e1 and 2 these
two outlets, whose locations x1 and x2 =1−x1 are determined by the First Order


















































128 =0 . The solution satisfying the





20a +3 6 a2 +1 3+11
46. Given that the





































20a +3 6 a2 +1 3+11
46.
Post-merger pattern
After merger, the remaining single-store ﬁrm (denoted 5)d o e sn o tr e l o c a t e ,
whereas the merged entity locates two stores within each half-segment, symmet-
rically around the mid-point (as shown by Pal and Sarkar (2002)). The merged

























































2 are the locations of the left-hand side outlets.





















































This system yields no explicit general solutions, but we computed solutions
for particular values of the demand parameter. Table 1 presents these solutions,
as well as the corresponding merged entity’s proﬁt.
Comparing the latter with the total pre-merger proﬁt of merger partners, we
ﬁnd that the merger is basically proﬁtable for low enough values of the reservation
price: 1.5 <a≤ 3. The explanation is provided by the merger location eﬀects:
the merged entity will supply each local market from the closest store only, so
that stores have no longer overlapping market areas. This output reallocation is
enhanced by outlet relocation: the four aﬃliates spread out towards the market
borders in an attempt to minimize total transport costs. Consequently, the merger
entity captures demand at the extreme consumer locations. For this captive de-
mand to be suﬃcient to guarantee merger proﬁtability, the demand parameter
itself needs to be low enough, otherwise, the market shares gained on demand
located at the market borders do not compensate for the market shares lost on
the rest of the segment6.
Spin-oﬀ
In a non-spatial context, as long as the market is not monopolized, Cournot
ﬁrms increase their proﬁts by credibly committing to produce more, by means of
spin-oﬀs. However, the spatial framework also provides incentives to divisionalize,
incentives related to the merger’s location eﬀects.
Relocation towards the market borders generates eﬃciency gains for the merged
entity, by reducing transport cost and by allowing it to capture distant demand.
For this, strategic substitutability requires stores take up distinct locations. Con-
sequently, the segment mid-point is forsaken by the merged entity, allowing the
outsider to beneﬁt alone from this most-preferred location on the segment. Ac-
tually, as long as the merged entity owns an even number of plants, the central
location is abandoned to the outsider. However, spinning oﬀ into two indepen-
dent divisions, each owning two outlets, mitigates the market share loss at the
mid-segment locations, while still allowing to capture demand at distant ones.
Partial divisionalization
Consider thus the merged entity spinning oﬀ into two independent two-store
divisions competing against the single-store outsider. More precisely, output and
6Remember that horizontal mergers exhibit a business stealing eﬀect beneﬁtting the out-
sider(s).
4location decisions are independent between divisions, but are centralized within
them. Let Π1,2 and Π3,4 denote the divisions’ proﬁts. From the analysis of Pal and
Sarkar (2002), we know that each division will locate both outlets symmetrically
around 1/2, with rival stores sharing symmetric locations. To put it short, rival
stores 1 and 3 locate at z∗ ∈ (0;1/2), whereas 2 and 4 at 1−z∗,w h e r ez∗ is given



























64. The First Order Condition requires
1
4a − az + 1
2z2 − 1
16 =0 ,h e n c ez∗ = a − 1
4
√
16a2 − 8a +2 .
To conclude on the proﬁtability of partial integration with respect to that
of total integration we need to compute the diﬀerence between the proﬁto ft h e
group of two independent 2-store divisions with that of the merged entity with
centralized decision making. Taking into account the optimal location z∗,t h e
proﬁt of the group is
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Since in the previous section we had already computed the proﬁto ft h ei n t e -
grated 4-store merged ﬁrm for diﬀerent values of the demand parameter, we only
need to evaluate the group’s proﬁt for the same values, presented in a separate
column of Table 1. To put it short, we ﬁnd (Π1,2 + Π3,4)−ΠM
1,2,3,4 > 0 for a>1.5.
The comparison is unambiguous: for all but the lowest values of the demand pa-
rameter, partial integration is more proﬁtable than centralized decision-making.
Complete divisionalization
The partial divisionalization equally turns out to be always more proﬁtable
than total divisionalization. To see that, suppose that following the merger the
group decides to spin oﬀ into 4 single-store independent divisions. Let Πind be the















108, since each independent
division will locate at the segment mid-point, together with the outsider. It is
straightforward to compute the diﬀerence between this total decentralized proﬁt
and the one folowing partial spin-oﬀ:
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864,w h i c hi s< 0 for all a ≥ 1.5. Therefore, complete divisionalization is always
5less proﬁtable that partial divisionalization. Moroever, evaluating 4Πind for the
same demand parameter values as before (the results are as well exhibited in Ta-
ble 1), we obtain that the complete spin-oﬀ is actually not proﬁtable here, since
Π1,2,3,4 > 4Πind always. Table 1 summarizes these comparisons for the demand
parameter values retained initially for merger proﬁtability.
Optimality of partial divisionalization
To sum up, partial integration is more proﬁtable than both total integration
and total divisionalization. The intuition is based on the idea that the partial
integration strikes a balance between two opposing proﬁt-oriented strategies for
the merged ﬁrm.
On the one hand, by running independent divisions, the merged entity is able
to reduce the business stealing eﬀect induced at every location x by the strate-
gic substitutability. But total divisionalization in this spatial setting cannot be
o p t i m a l ,s i n c ei tw o u l dw a s t ea n ye ﬃciency gains from relocation7.O nt h eo t h e r
hand, owning multi-store divisions does preserve the relocation advantage, i.e. the
possibility to capture the distant demand located at the segment borders. To put
it diﬀerently, four is too high a number of outlets to eﬃciently capture distant
demand. One store on each side is actually optimal, since this still ensures a lower
marginal delivery cost at the market borders, but the location closer to the market
center also reduces the outsider’s marginal delivery cost advantage for middle loca-
tions. These positive relocation eﬀects enhance the reduction of business stealing
and justify the optimality of this partial spin-oﬀ,w h i c ha l l o w st h em e r g e de n t i t y
to beneﬁt from the advantages of both strategies. The only exception occurs for
the lowest values of the demand parameter (a in the neighborhood of 1.5). For
s u c hav e r yl o wd e m a n d ,t h el o c a t i o na d v a n t a g eo fh a v i n gas t o r ev e r yc l o s et ot h e
market border is overwhelming, thus justifying the proﬁtability of the integration
strategy. However, this is always the case with spatial Cournot mergers, which
become less and less proﬁtable when the demand parameter increases8.
Divestiture
A straightforward comparison between the total pre-merger proﬁto ft h em e r g -
ing partners and the group’s proﬁt with partial divisionalization reveals that the
partial spin-oﬀ is always proﬁtable for the two merger participants, even when
merger is not, namely for the higher values of the demand parameter. In other
7Remermber that each independent store locates at the market center, just like the outsider
8When a increases, the gain of market shares at distant locations becomes relatively less
important, whereas the loss of market shares at the other locations weighs more and more.
6words, it can be proﬁtable for ﬁrms to merge unproﬁtably but to spin oﬀ after-
wards and thereby increase their proﬁts. Mergers often raised proﬁtability doubts
i np r a c t i c e ,n o to n l yi nt h e o r y . W ea r g u eh e r et h a tu n p r o ﬁtable mergers may
occur since they provide ﬁrms with the opportunity to (more) proﬁtably spin oﬀ
or divest afterwards. Spin-oﬀs are basically transfers of property rights on the
ﬁrm’s assets, just like structural merger remedies. Our framework thus suggests
an interpretation in terms of divestitures, since they may very well improve merger
proﬁtability instead of reducing it, even when they fulﬁll their corrective role.
To support this idea, we brieﬂy discuss the price eﬀect of the merger. Since
independent Cournot equilibria obtain for each local market x ∈ [0;1], the price
comparison is performed accordingly. Rather extensive computations are neces-
sary, and since they are space-consuming, they are grouped in a Technical Ap-
pendix available on request.
A ﬁrst price comparison at every local market on the segment reveals that
the merger to duopoly is everywhere anticompetitive, i.e. it leads to a price
increase throughout the set of spatial markets. In such cases, merger control
authorities typically require an asset transfer to remedy the competitive harm.
Divestitures are meant to make the market structure more symmetric, and thus
enhance competitive pressure exerted on the merged entity, preventing therefore
the price-raise eﬀect of the merger. Here, one of the merging partners is single-
store, so meaningful remedies necessarily involve the divestiture of two outlets.
In our framework, the market entry through the take over of the two divested
aﬃliates yields the same market structure and spatial pattern as the partial spin-
oﬀ. The latter lowers the post-merger price, so such a divestiture would be declared
successful by the merger control authority9.Y e t ,w eh a v es e e nt h a ta tt h es a m e
time it improves merger proﬁtability, through the revenue from the sale of the two
aﬃliates10. This is precisely the intuition for the positive impact of the divestiture
for the merger proﬁtability: since a merger generates a positive externality for the
9Moreover, the price comparison between the market structure before merger and the one
after divestiture equally shows that the latter reduces the average price. To be precise, the
only markets where price goes up after divestiture are those in the close neighborhood of 1/2.
Nevertheless, further computation reveals that the total positive eﬀect on all other consumers
exceeds the consumer loss for these central markets, so the divestiture has a net positive overall
eﬀect.
10Note however that the implicit assumption is that the merged entity cashes in the maximum
willingness to pay of the new entrant, but this is rather a standard assumption, which can be
justiﬁed by the fact that the divestiture represents an opportunity to enter the market for the
external ﬁrm, therefore the bargaining power lies with the incumbent.
7other ﬁrms in the industry, the revenue from divestiture allows the merged entity
to recover part of this externality.
3. Conclusion
This paper addresses the issue of proﬁtable spin-oﬀ following a horizontal
merger in a spatial Cournot framework. Merging and spin-oﬀ are opposite strate-
gies for ﬁrms, and under standard linearity hypotheses they are not simultaneously
proﬁtable. Here, merging and completely integrating aﬃl i a t e si si n d e e dp r o ﬁtable,
thanks to eﬃciency gains from relocation. Nevertheless, the subsequent spin-oﬀ
is even more proﬁtable. However, that does not mean operating completely inde-
pendent outlets, but just partially divisionalizing into multi-store divisions. This
still allows the group to beneﬁt from the relocation advantage, but also represents
ac o m m i t m e n tt oi n c r e a s eo u t p u ta te v e ry local market. To a certain extent,
we identify here a rationale for mergers (regardless of their internal proﬁtabil-
ity), namely the opportunity to proﬁtably divisionalize afterwards. The market
outcome is actually the same as after the divestiture to a new entrant, which
yields a particular conclusion on the impact of structural remedies on merger
proﬁtability: divestitures, even when they do restore competition, basically allow
the merged entity to recover some of the externality it exerted on the other ﬁrms
on the market, so in a sense they increase merger proﬁtability. The eﬀect is all
the more outstanding when the merger is not only anticompetitive (so the remedy
is necessary), but also unproﬁtable in the beginning.
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